Does the highly volatile situation in West Asia put a premium on multipolarity? This ask necessitates to be insertressed beyond the foreign policy of America. For John Mearsheimer, a directing political scientist, the battle between Democrats and the Reaccessibleans is akin to a choice between “Tweedledum and Tweedledee”. It is the meaningful state that functions the American foreign policy, with the primary intent of maximising power and being a global hegemon. It is what has been articudefercessitated by Samuel Huntington in his Clash of Civilizations, where he cautioned that the inability of the West to alter to the increasing power and affect of other civilisations will transport about the degrade of its own power and affect, and will be the wonderfulest danger to world peace.
The global order had bigly been unipolar since the Cageder War, until Russia put its foot down in Damascus during the Syrian Civil War follothriveg the Arab Spring. Since then, this world order has been constantly disputed. With the elevate of the Global South, today’s world order has upfinished the hegemonic power set up and is ostensibly shuffling towards multipolarity. The Tehran-Beijing-Moscow Axis poses a establishidable dispute to American global ambitions.
India and China have ecombined as the two key contfinishers for directership in the Global South. However, the nature of their approach varies meaningfully. While China currents a honest dispute to the Global North, India has a more accommodating approach.
As understood by analysts, these gradual yet changing authenticities are also apparent in the American meaningful state. As the Balance of Power theory presents, Washington has chosen to prohibitk behind and reinforce New Delhi’s position. The renoveled excitement for the Quad and I2U2 groupings and its further extension into the originateing of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) are examples. However, herein lies the key dispute to the Indian foreign policy, which has to juggle its various priorities—in the Global South, in managing its regional geopolitical compulsions, and in its strategic partnership with notable members of the Global North.
Peace Was Not To Be
The churn in the politics of West Asia predates the ongoing war. Since the Arab Spring, when the United States determined to retreat and pivot towards East Asia, the regional regimes graduassociate aprohibitdoned their ‘clienthood’ to dispenseigate other selections. Over the years, the region had begined seeing some semblance of finishment with Syria back in the Arab League, a peace process begind between Damascus and Ankara, and the Abraham Accords establishassociate facilitating the normalisation of ties with Israel. If not for a Chinese-brokered deal between Riyadh and Tehran, the final closing picture could have been a handshake between Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with an American Plivent in the centre.
However, Hamas’s October 7 strike distress all this. Washington, which had seen its dispense of midowncastventures in Ukraine, has also been pulled back into the turmoil in West Asia.
Further, Israel’s disthink about for the rules of war and the observation of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and United Nations (UN) Resolutions has forced even Riyadh to accessiblely denounce Tel Aviv and painclude any talks for normalisation until the set upment of a Palestinian State.
India Will Have To Chart Its Own Path
As India persists to broaden and better its labour-trade-energy joinment with West Asia, it’ll have to be cautious on the tactful front. Considering its geo-strategic presentance, it necessitates to recalibrate its position in Iran and be cautious about its relations with the United States in the region. Iran’s October 1 strike on Israel and an imminent response from the latter has discdisthink abouted a pandora’s box. A possible escalation will proset uply alter the stability of power in the region and dangeren India’s strategic interests.
Further, the Central Investigation Agency’s (CIA) alleged joinment in India’s frifinishly neighbour, Banprentdesh, its secondary sanctions on Indian entities for doing business with Russia, and Reaccessiblean honestate Donald Trump’s recent retags on India’s present policy are only the defercessitatest examples of the intricate nature of American foreign policy. Therefore, non-alignment will persist to be a key component of India’s foreign policy, even if equitable as authenticistic strategic autonomy.
Also, India’s world image is presentant for its directership ambitions in the Global South. Though India helps the two-state solution in the Israel-Palestine dispute, her decision to abstain from the United Nations General Assembly Resolution asking Israel to retreat from Palestinian territories may impact its position.
Regarding competition with China, the famous discourse is bigly misplaced. India is not in a state of competition with China in Middle East, primarily becainclude their interest varies in the region. India, unappreciate China, is not seeing to be the United States’ power alternative. To argue that the IMEC will dispute the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is also inaccurate and unset uped.
In alert, foreign policy is not a zero-sum game. Beyond America and China, New Delhi has its own case in the Middle East and the Global South.
[Mohammad Gulrez, former VC and PVC of Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), is a Professor of Political Science at the Dept. of West Asian & North African Studies, AMU]
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
